



Pushing and prodding, goading and hand-holding

Reflection from the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) at the conclusion of the World Summit on the Information Society

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Introduction

The Civil Society Statement on WSIS concluded that: "The broad mandate for WSIS was to address the long-standing issues in economic and social development from the newly emerging perspectives of the opportunities and risks posed by the revolution in Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs). The summit was expected to identify and articulate new development possibilities and paradigms being made possible in the Information Society, and to evolve public policy options for enabling and realising these opportunities. (Civil Society Statement on WSIS, 'Much more could have been achieved[1]'). The statement finishes by saying that "Overall, it is impossible not to conclude that WSIS has failed to live up to these expectations." In this article, APC presents its verdict.

As a network committed to the use of information and communication technologies for social justice and sustainable development, the APC believes that the ability to access, produce and share information is a key requirement for creating more equal and just societies. We approached the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) from this perspective[2] and promoted the idea that the internet is a global public good to be developed and governed in the public interest.[3]

We were sceptical at the outset. The organisers used problematic concepts such as 'digital

divide', 'information society', 'knowledge economy' and 'multi-stakeholderism'. APC has always argued that disparities in access to ICTs are a symptom of broader social and economic divides between and within countries, rather than a specifically 'digital' divide. 'Knowledge economy' implies that information and knowledge are commodities to be traded, protected and marketed to those with the capacity to buy them, rather than be accessible to all. 'Multi-stakeholderism' glosses over the important goal of making processes more inclusive, enriched by a diversity of voices and perspectives[4].

Many substantial issues, such as IPRs (intellectual property rights), rules and barriers imposed by trade agreements, external debt, interconnection costs[5], were left out. And, for an event which has ICTs *for development* as a core theme, there was little focus on other global development processes, such as the Monterrey consensus on development finance and the Millennium Development Goals.

Not all government leadership is aware of the potential of information and communications for sustainable national development. We believe governments must take responsibility and be accountable for ensuring that citizens and communities have access to the opportunities and freedoms provided by ICTs. WSIS was a specific opportunity for civil society to engage in debate, discussion, and collaboration with governments, a process that is frequently easier to initiate in a global forum than at regional or national levels.

While it is too soon to evaluate the impact of WSIS, we believe that the process has been valuable, and that it might lead to positive change. Answering these questions can help us to assess the value of the process:

Did WSIS contribute to greater integration of ICTs with development and social justice work? Did it generate new ideas and partnerships for implementation of concrete activities? Did it increase knowledge and capacity in ICTs among key development actors at local level? Did it increase ICT professionals' understanding of development? Did it increase public awareness of the potential of ICTs for development? And, what is the nature of this awareness? Did it create unrealistic expectations? Did WSIS contribute to greater cooperation between diverse actors? Did it lead to the private sector increasing investment in ICT solutions that are relevant, needed, sustainable and affordable? And, finally, did WSIS set a precedent for a *new* kind of global public policy process that is more open and inclusive?

This article does not answer all these questions systematically, but touches on them all.

Creating spaces for non-state actors

Prior to WSIS, UN summits were largely restricted to inter-governmental debate and negotiations. Civil society summits would usually run in parallel to those of governments, and often at some distance. During the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) governments met in Beijing while NGOs met some 50 kilometres away in Huairou; and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) in Johannesburg, governments met in the elite business zone of Sandton, while civil society met in the township of Soweto.

Accreditation of civil society organisations (CSOs) through the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) made limited participation possible, but the requirements are stringent. Even in the relatively 'open' WSIS process, accreditation was used to exclude CSOs, if a government insisted—as was the case of NGO Human Rights in China; refused accreditation at the insistence of the People's Republic of China[6].

In general, at WSIS, there was recognition that the agenda involved challenges which governments could not address on their own. The private sector, civil society and international organisations were all included as key 'stakeholder' groups. This is a welcome approach despite its limitations. It's also possible that this openness had its roots in the fact that the internet and related platforms and processes have not been under intergovernmental control, and have in fact been primarily developed by non-governmental actors and initiatives.

In theory, anyone could participate, until the point of negotiations on the text of the summit declaration and action plans, which remained the prerogative of governments. In practice, the extent to which civil society and the private sector were able to contribute to deliberations evolved significantly during the four-year WSIS process as key participants became more familiar with one another and governments increasingly acknowledged the value of non-governmental inputs.

Though the rules for participation were not always clear, and were interpreted differently by chairs of the various working groups, in a sense this vagueness and ambiguity ensured that questions of power, inclusion and accountability remained on the agenda.

CSOs at WSIS: cooperation, cooptation and disruption

During the Geneva phase of WSIS (2001-2003), many governments, from both developed and developing countries, objected to the active participation of CSOs.

Some feared that CSO participation would disrupt the intergovernmental process, a space normally reserved for sovereign states.

Others rejected CSO participation on the basis that most CSOs, particularly international ones, were primarily from developed countries, well-resourced, and 'unrepresentative' of national grassroots organisations. Some governments maintained that they were the only 'legitimate' representatives of civil society, and additional CSO participation was unnecessary. Others were intimidated by CSO participation and interventions, particularly in relation to controversial issues such as human rights.



Illustration 1 Civil society organised a World Forum on Communications Rights at the Geneva WSIS. Photo: FMA

But resistance to civil society participation did not come from governments alone. CSOs themselves grappled with questions of identity, diversity, legitimacy, representation, power, decision-making and consensus.

Some organisations criticised the involvement of civil society in WSIS as lending legitimacy to a flawed intergovernmental process and co-opting oppositional voices.

With civil society 'inside' the process, governments and organisers could be assured of less trouble 'outside' the process. It meant that CSOs were responding to the official agenda, at the expense of creating their own.

CSOs spent considerable time and energy overcoming the flaws of civil society structures - created to facilitate communication, coordination, participation, procedures and content - particularly with regards to power, roles, responsibilities and representation.

This came at the expense of producing concrete proposals on key issues and as the WSIS process proceeded, civil society lobbying increasingly shifted towards positions that represented the lowest common denominator; positions that seemed likely to get substantial government support.

Some independent groups were critical of CSOs that worked inside the process, and there was little cooperation or solidarity between the two during the summit in Geneva. But this dynamic changed during the second phase of WSIS (2004-5) as groups inside and outside the Tunis process worked in solidarity on the human rights and freedom of information agenda. This agenda emerged in response to WSIS II being hosted by the Tunisian government, which has a poor human rights record in relation to freedom of the press, association, opinion and expression.

But looking back at the entire process, CSOs could have been increasingly effective in facilitating more inputs, and in developing mechanisms to evaluate, present and prioritise these inputs. Some of the thematic caucuses did achieve this, for example the gender, youth, disability, privacy and governance caucuses. But many did not.

Regional and national differences

The extent to which civil society used this opportunity to widen and deepen debate in the WSIS process, the public domain and the regional and national level varied significantly from region to region and from country to country.

In Africa many more people became involved, particularly young people, and people from outside established NGOs, leading to the formation of ACSIS (African Civil Society for the Information Society). But at the same time the African Civil Society Caucus found it difficult to overcome the French-English language divide. Good examples that stand out from African civil society's involvement is the dynamic African Youth Caucus^[7] who took the Ghana PrepCom in January 2005 by storm, and SANGONeT's^[8] series of public face-to-face discussions on the national relevance of the WSIS.



Illustration 2 Multistakeholder workshop to align Philippine action plans with WSIS priorities. Photo: FMA

Relatively fewer civil society organisations from Asia participated in the second phase than in the first. Nevertheless, there were gains at national level, e.g. in the Philippines APC members Foundation for Media Alternatives^[9] and WomensHub both feel that the WSIS forced policy makers to broaden their view on information and communications, the internet, internet governance and on civil society participation. It was also instrumental in CSOs documenting their demands and perspectives on these issues.

In some European countries CSOs were well-organised and worked closely with their national delegations, e.g. in Switzerland, Denmark and Germany. Whether WSIS forged stronger regional links that will endure beyond the Tunis Summit among CSOs in Europe is less clear.

Among Latin American CSOs debate and discussion around the WSIS became very difficult during phase II, primarily as a result of ideological and territorial differences and the difficulty in resolving these in online spaces. At regional level however, organisations remained very active, making written submissions to regional PrepComs and using platforms like the World Social Forum to keep information and communication issues on the agenda. These processes, and the work done around WSIS have primed a large number of organisations for participation in and critique of the regional strategy (E-LAC 2007). Again there were national gains, with CSOs working closely with governments in addressing national challenges and influencing global agendas (as was the case in Brazil where CSO delegates worked closely with

government on internet governance).[10]

WSIS: setting a new precedent for global policy processes?

There is no doubt that the involvement of civil society enriched debate by providing specific expertise and experience. Two examples worth noting are the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) process and outcomes, and the recognition given to human rights in formal summit documents and media coverage of the Tunis Summit held in November 2005.

The greater involvement of CSOs and other non-state actors may have stemmed from the specialised technical nature of WSIS and does not necessarily create a precedent for other UN processes. Nonetheless, a step has been taken in changing the nature of the intergovernmental process. Other global public policy spaces, which require the full involvement of non-state actors in order to shape policy environments that benefit *all*, could do well to follow the model.

For CSOs the specific challenge is to find ways of working on the inside without being diverted from their priorities.

The internet governance debate

Many people, particularly those involved in ICTs for development, argue that it does not matter how the internet is governed if the majority of the world's people do not have access to it.

There is an element of truth in that, but we believe that social change takes place through shifts at several levels. In a world where decision-making power is already so concentrated, being able to make a difference to how the internet is governed is a way of saying that *things need to change*, as well as showing that *they can change*.

For many involved in the WSIS debate it was also a platform for ensuring that the internet be recognised as a public good that should be governed on the basis of public interest and policy. [11]

In the case of internet governance, the key achievement was the establishment of the WGIG as a body in which multiple stakeholders had equal representation. It was an open space, populated with diverse voices and had a significant effect on the outcome of the internet governance debate in WSIS.

The WGIG made four sets of recommendations:

- the need for a forum to discuss broad public policy issues related to the internet,
- oversight models for internet governance,
- measures to promote development and access to the internet, and
- capacity building for developing countries to allow more effective participation in internet governance.

Civil society participation was decisive in three of these issues (excluding oversight models), with the formation of an internet governance forum (IGF) emerging as the key point of consensus in the Tunis Summit.

Post-WSIS, the IGF is intended to constitute a global public policy space of a new kind that is open to all stakeholders. Of course there are no guarantees that the IGF will be truly inclusive, nor that it will achieve its stated objective of approaching internet governance with the needs and priorities of developing countries in mind. This is precisely why those who are committed to changing the way internet governance decisions are made should make a strong effort to make an impact on this continuing process.

Financing ICTD: few gains and many opportunities lost

This was a key area for WSIS to address and one that never seemed to be tackled with

conviction. The gains are at the level of damage control and general proposals, rather than through concrete actions.

The Geneva Plan of Action (December 2003) endorsed a Digital Solidarity Agenda, to put in place 'the conditions for mobilizing human, financial and technological resources for inclusion of all men and women in the emerging Information Society'.

Between Geneva and Tunis, a review of the existing financial mechanisms was conducted by the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms[12], set up to break the deadlock in discussions on financing. The Task Force had a very narrow brief (reviewing existing mechanisms) and a very short period in which to complete its work. Unlike the Working Group on Internet Governance it did not systematically gather diverse perspectives or increased understanding of the issue.



*Illustration 3 Refurbishing computers in rural Nigeria.
Photo: Fantsuam Foundation*

The Task Force found a number of areas in which current approaches to ICTD financing are not adequate, such as: ICT capacity building programmes; access and connectivity in remote rural areas, isolated islands, and locations that present market challenges; regional backbone infrastructure to link networks across borders; broadband capacity; applications and content to integrate ICT into the implementation of development sector programmes in health, education, etc.

Governments endorsed this view in the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, and also made proposals for improvements in existing financial mechanisms. These included enhancing

regional cooperation and creating multi-stakeholder partnerships, especially for building regional backbone infrastructure; providing affordable access to ICTs by reducing international internet costs charged by backbone providers; coordinating programmes among governments and major financial players to mitigate investment risks and transaction costs for operators entering rural and low income market segments; helping to accelerate the development of domestic financial instruments; multilateral, regional and bilateral development organisations to consider creating a virtual forum for the sharing of information on potential projects, financing sources and mechanisms; multilateral, regional and bilateral development organisations to consider cooperating to support developing countries that request assistance with respect to ICT policies.

The Digital Solidarity Fund[13], an African proposal which met with vigorous rejection from 'donor' countries when it was first mooted during the Geneva phase, was eventually welcomed as 'an innovative financial mechanism of a voluntary nature'. In its current incarnation the DSF seems little more than a face-saving mechanism: those states who initiated and supported it won a nominal victory; and developed countries avoided adding insult to injury by ridiculing an African effort to finance ICT development and at the same time not making any concrete commitments to addressing the growing gap in access to ICT tools and infrastructure.

The challenge is now what to make of these financial and digital solidarity issues in the process of implementation after Tunis. The dominant paradigm of leaving ICT development up to the market has not prevailed: the 'damage control' referred to above. The logic of this argument was that if developing countries simply create an enabling policy and regulatory environment, investment in ICT would follow. However, the policy decisions on financing in the Tunis Agenda made it clear that existing financial mechanisms were inadequate in certain respects and private sector finance was not going to be the only solution. Scepticism regarding the efficacy

of the market in under-served areas or development zones, allowed different perspectives to emerge but not to crystallise fully in the Tunis Agenda.[\[14\]](#)

The issue of open access models – which go beyond traditional infrastructure to deliver connectivity to populations, such as wireless networks - was picked up by the Task Force but was only tangentially addressed in the Tunis Agenda. Nevertheless open access emerged as a possible way forward with regard to ICTD through the publication of two research documents at Tunis and in events hosted at the Summit.[\[15\]](#)

In effect, the onus with regard to financing ICTD has shifted to national governments, which need to prioritise ICTD as part of their national development strategies if ICTD is to receive funding from Official Development Assistance (ODA). The role of the multilateral development banks also shifted slightly during the WSIS process as they became more willing to again consider financing infrastructure.

These shifts can create conditions in which developing countries could develop a new approach to ICTD in under-served areas. They could combine the use of Universal Access Funds with ODA funds, prioritised within their national development budgets as well as with infrastructure finance to bring in a new approach to ICTD based on open access models. However, to do this, developing country ministries of finance, development and communications need to work together and engage with development practitioners, ICTD specialists, civil society, donor agencies, the private sector and multilateral development banks.

This should happen within an explicit ICTD framework that gives equal weight to the empowerment of citizens in the process, and that gives priority to development, human rights (particularly privacy rights and freedom of expression) and gender justice as integral goals of development.

Human rights

Human rights have been central to the WSIS process since its inception. During the first phase, civil society, led by the WSIS Civil Society Human Rights Caucus, mobilised significant energy and formed a broad based coalition that lobbied for the centrality of human rights in the Geneva documents. In spite of this, and the resulting endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, several specific rights, including workers' rights and the right to privacy, were referred to only scantily.

In its publication on WSIS phase I[\[16\]](#), APC outlined its belief that the ability to share information and communicate freely was vital to the realisation of human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976)[\[17\]](#) and, that as new ICTs emerge and new policy and legislation come into effect, human rights must be at the heart of the WSIS process.

The Tunisian government's clampdown on freedom of expression (including website filtering, intimidation of journalists and the sabotage of the Citizen's Summit on the Information Society, a WSIS side-event organised by a group of international organisations in partnership with Tunisian human rights and media freedom groups) made this point loudly and clearly. That the host of the world's summit on the information society engaged so blatantly in suppression of human rights made a mockery of the process.

As WSIS drew to a close, hundreds of CSOs and individuals signed an open letter to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan after witnessing "both inside and outside the official Summit serious attacks on human rights and the right to freedom of expression"[\[18\]](#). They called on the Secretary-General to "undertake a thorough-going review of procedures leading up to the choice of host country (of UN summits), the protocols for host country agreements with UN agencies and the commitments required of the host country.



The letter added that the summit in Tunis "reminded us of the importance of being constantly vigilant and of the courage of those who speak out in the

Illustration 4 Tunisian government suppression of free speech under the spotlight at WSIS. Journalists interview human rights advocates. Courtesy: BlueLink

face of repression and censorship."

As the Civil Society statement on WSIS notes[\[19\]](#), "in the post WSIS phase, there is an urgent need to strengthen the means of human rights enforcement in the information society, to enhance human rights proofing of national legislation and practises, to strengthen education and awareness raising on rights-based development, to transform human rights standards into ICT policy recommendations; and to mainstream ICT issues into the global and regional human rights monitoring system".

In short, governments need to move from declarations and paper commitments to action.

Implementation and follow up

If we regard the WSIS process as an exercise in global policy making (even with all the limitations involved in the process), then attention needs to be given to the process of policy implementation of the WSIS Geneva Plan of Action and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. Whether we like or agree with the policies encapsulated in these texts or not, a process of policy implementation will unfold at national, regional and international levels.

Civil Society is faced with a great challenge if it is to engage effectively with the multiplicity of implementation channels it is currently presented with, particularly those groups and individuals faced with severe barriers to participation including finance, know-how, language, capacity and geographical remoteness.

Implementation will follow two main channels: a) Implementation-[\[20\]](#) of the 11 Chapters of the Geneva Plan of Action (the Tunis Agenda) and b) the Internet Governance Forum.

Various UN agencies and UN regional commissions have committed, at least in principle, to moderate/coordinate implementation of specific action lines from the Geneva Plan of Action [\[21\]](#). The ITU, UNESCO and UNDP will at least initially, facilitate overall implementation of the action lines, by for example, convening meetings to discuss 'coordination, modalities and logistics' of implementation.

The UN agencies involved in follow up and implementation are to be coordinated by a UN Group on the Information Society set up by the Secretary General within the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB), drawing on the experience of the ITU, UNESCO and UNDP.

ECOSOC will oversee system wide follow up of WSIS and review the mandate of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) for this purpose.

In addition to these UN mechanisms, governments have been asked to create 'inclusive national implementation mechanisms that integrate e-strategies into national development plans and funding requests'.

When it comes to internet governance, the UN Secretary-General is to convene a meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) by the third quarter of 2006 [22].

There are a number of issues for CSOs to think about in considering follow up and implementation. The first is the commitment to multi-stakeholder participation at all levels of WSIS implementation. Some national governments and UN regional commissions have been hostile to civil society and the private sector being involved in policy making. Intergovernmental organisations vary significantly in terms of the extent to which civil society can access their processes and content.

It is incumbent on CSOs and the private sector to continue to place pressure on these institutions to be open to multi-stakeholder participation in WSIS implementation activities

The second is that the nature and shape of the implementation processes at all levels will be determined in the next six months. It is very important that CSOs make their views heard about how implementation is to take place and to directly and critically engage the institutions responsible for facilitating implementation. Nothing is guaranteed here, and the gains that have been made could be lost if civil society stands down and demobilises in the immediate post-WSIS period. Those elements of civil society and the private sector that did not engage in the WSIS process directly should reconsider their positions and get involved in the implementation.

The first round of consultations, on both WSIS action line implementation and the internet governance forum, will take place in Geneva, February 2006 and it is likely that the Secretary-General will then call for or conduct a series of public and private consultations on the shape of the implementation process thereafter. It is vital that civil society makes its views known by actively engaging in these consultations and strategically influencing national governments' participation.

The third point is that the Secretary-General's powers with regard to the IGF will be restrained. In Tunis, the US government proposed that the international association, the Internet Society, convene the IGF. This was opposed, but the language allows for bodies other than the UN to play a role in coordinating the IGF. This reflects the sensitivity involved in the negative perception of the UN playing any kind of role in internet governance at all. It creates a space for a new type of entity in global public policy – one with a relationship to the UN but not part of the UN – a kind of forum that is two things at the same time.

Lastly, there is a great danger that CSOs' collective resources will be over stretched in responding to the multiple demands involved in implementation and follow up. One of the lessons of WSIS for CSOs is that its actions must not be determined by, what is likely to be a very bureaucratic process. Civil society actors must prioritise their agenda and focus on elements of the implementation process which allow for open and constructive dialogue and action. They need to form coalitions and alliances which build, rather than diminish their capacity to shape policies and implement initiatives which reflect their agenda.

Conclusion

WSIS has been basically a discursive exercise and at this point its outcomes impact more in the *virtual* areas of networking, and political debate than in the area of *concrete* decisions.

Wider political debate, and the extensive multi-dimensional networking and relationship

building produced by a four-year process are significant, and could potentially set all kinds of changes and actions in motion.

But, it is early days. The eventual impacts will only be evident in the next few years. It will depend on action and collaboration at regional and national level; on southern governments forming alliances, working together, taking risks (e.g. saying no to binding deals with large multinational software companies), creating competitive environments for business and opportunities for local initiatives, and ensuring that private monopolies do not take over from public monopolies.

There is no guarantee that governments will do this, or even that intergovernmental organisations will facilitate such action. However CSOs can make sure that we keep pushing and prodding, goading and hand-holding -depending on what is required at different junctures.

The cost-versus-benefit question is a very difficult one to answer. Taking a hard look at concrete outcomes of WSIS, one would have to say that it was not worth the money and time. However, the power of networking, and the intended and unintended consequences of having so many people interacting with one another and a set of issues for an extended period should not be underestimated.

People drive change, and changing how people think and act is not a trivial process. WSIS for all its flaws did change the way in which many people think about ICTs for development. It produced many new relationships, many of them between national civil society, government and business. People and organisations have the capacity to be creative, and to innovate.

Did WSIS produce the political will from governments that would provide a suitable backdrop for this creativity?

The answer varies from country to country, but in many developing countries post-WSIS there is now far more focus on the integration of ICTs and information and communications with social, economic and political development than there was before.

Reflecting specifically on the APC community's involvement in WSIS, we feel that overall it was worthwhile. APC members are concerned with organising and collaborating for change at the local level, through building community wireless networks, telecentres, building capacity of women's organisations, ICT support for human rights and environmental activists and for the community media sector, through working for trade justice, local ICT policy advocacy, and all the other 'nuts and bolts' social change work that we are part of, directly or indirectly. The summit itself created an opportunity for people in our networks who had never attended large international forums to learn, to blog, to explore new tools and technologies, and to take a hard and critical look into a global policy making process.

As a network, we try to reflect critically on our work, to be accountable in our actions and our relationships with the communities and partner organisations we work with. For us, WSIS was a valuable opportunity. It did not provide the answers and actions we hoped it would, but we believe that our involvement will enrich our ongoing work at international, regional and local levels.

14 February 2006

FOOTNOTES

[1]http://www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit-statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf

[2] APC, along with other organisations, including ALAI, AMARC and WACC lobbied in the late 1990s for the UN to convene an international event to address information and communication issues. These organisations working together as 'Voices 21' made a strategic decision to participate in the WSIS in spite of what they felt were the limitations of the ITU's approach to the process.

[3] This position was first outlined in "Financing the Information Society in the South: A Global Public Goods Perspective" by Pablo Accuosto and Nicky Johnson of ITeM in June 2004.

<http://rights.apc.org/documents/financing.pdf>

[4] For an article on multi-stakeholder participation in the WSIS see APC News, April 2005.

<http://www.apc.org/english/news/index.shtml?x=31497>

[5] APC's views on interconnection costs are outlined in a paper by Mike Jensen published in September 2005. http://rights.apc.org/documents/interconnection_costs.pdf

[6] <http://www.iris.sgdg.org/actions/smsi/hr-wsis/openletter-hric-en.html>

[7] Made possible through support from the Economic Commission for Africa.

[8] APC member SANGONeT from South Africa convened several public meetings on the WSIS and compiled a collective input from civil society: 'Content, Capacity, Connectivity'.

http://www.sangonet.org.za/portal/images/stories/ICT_Advocacy/wsis-civilsocietystatementfinal23september2005.pdf

[9] <http://www.fma.ph> and <http://www.womenshub.net/>

[10] Carlos Afonso, past chair of APC and technical director of APC member in Brazil, Rits, was a member of the Working Group on Internet Governance and collaborated very closely with the national delegation during phase II.

[11] APC's position on internet governance can be found at

http://rights.apc.org/documents/apc_recommendations_ig_EN.pdf

[12] For a review of the TFFM's work refer to the article in APC News, April 2005,

<http://www.apc.org/english/news/index.shtml?x=31483>.

[13] <http://www.dsf-fsn.org/>

[14] APC documented its observations on the TFFM's work in an open letter to the convenor of the TF, and in a response to his reply. http://rights.apc.org/documents/tffm/apc_letter_tffm_071204.pdf,

http://rights.apc.org/documents/tffm/apc_letter_tffm_undpresponse101204.pdf (the reply)

http://rights.apc.org/documents/tffm/apc_letter_tffm_121204.pdf (APC's response).

[15] See InfoDev: Open Access Models: Options for Improving Backbone Access in Developing Countries (with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa), 2005. <http://www.infodev.org/content/highlights/detail/2568> and Sean O Siochru and Bruce Girard: Community-based Networks and Innovative Technologies, UNDP, 2005

[16] Involving Civil Society in ICT policy, <http://www.apc.org/english/news/index.shtml?x=14223>

[17] http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm

[18] <http://www.apc.org/english/news/index.shtml?x=2657224>

[19] 'Much more could have been achieved' http://www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit-statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf

[20] From paragraph 83 of the Tunis Agenda. <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>

[21] http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1160|0

[22] Internet Governance Forum Possible Timeline: <http://www.intgovforum.org/timeline2.htm>