ISSUES in INTERNET RIGHTS:
CENSORSHIP CASE STUDIES
INTERNET CENSORSHIP CASE STUDIES
Radio
B92 and OpenNet (Serbia)
Radio
B92
BACKGROUND
During
the break-up of former Yugoslavia the majority of local
mainstream media decided to take a non-critical attitude
towards negative social phenomena such as hate speech, war
clamouring, promotion of ethnic intolerance, etc. Such media
activity, without any doubt, heavily influenced courses
of bloody wars that raged trough the Balkans during the
past ten years.
From the very beginning of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia,
Belgrade's Radio B92 refused to conform to the trend of
giving blind support to the official policy of Serbian state
officials. This station was always providing its listeners
with uncensored news, no matter what positive or negative
impact this news could have on the course of the official
policy. Instead of engaging in sabre rattling, Radio B92
was calling for civility and reason; instead of engaging
in a campaign of xenophobia and spreading of ethnic hatred,
the radio was promoting multiculturalism and tolerance.
Despite the dramatic developments that started rolling out
at a tremendous rate, the radio stayed on the same editorial
course. Soon it became one of the most popular radio stations
in Belgrade and many of its shows were directly broadcast
or re-broadcast on a number of local media in Serbia.
In many attempts to silence all forms of criticism of the
official politics, the regime of the Serbian (and later
Yugoslav) president Slobodan Milosevic tried numerous forms
of open repression over the independent media. During its
history, Radio B92 had been frequently harassed by the regime.
The radio's broadcasting frequency (92,5 MHz FM) was jammed
on numerous occasions by the secret police and the station
was closed a couple of times - during the massive pro-opposition
civil and student protests in the spring of 1991 and winter
of 1996, shortly after the beginning of NATO bombings in
1999, and for the last time at the beginning of summer this
year.
Exposed to this kind of pressure, the station was constantly
trying to find or build channels for distributing information
about local events to a domestic and international public.
The use of the Internet and satellite radio/TV broadcasts
proved to be the most effective ways of achieving those
goals.
The
Internet division of Radio B92 started operating in 1992,
using a tiny link with the Yugoslav Academic Network for
UUCP email transfers only. In 1996, Radio B92 established
a leased line with XS4ALL, an ISP in Amsterdam, and Opennet.org
was formed. The link with XS4ALL was used since then for
encrypted email transfers, distribution of the radio's news
bulletins to thousand of email addresses worldwide. Apart
from that, Opennet servers hosted a number of Web sites
and discussion forums for various NGOs, anti-war campaigns,
feminist groups, etc.
When
the radio had been closed for the second time, during the
massive civil and student protests in 1996, its program
was broadcast for the first time over the Internet in Real
Audio format. Those days, on the streets of Belgrade, one
could hear for the first time that the most information
on what was happening in the city was coming from the Internet,
meaning by Real Audio stream or email news bulletins of
Radio B92.
However, despite this "Internet revolution in Belgrade"
(Wired 5.04), members of the ruling establishment did not
reach for some wider Internet censorship, counting on the
fact that at that time less than 100,000 people had some
kind of Internet access (and that number represented less
than 1% of the total population).
Instead of enforcing a full-scale control over the use of
Internet services, the regime in Serbia decided to give
its exponents a carte blanche for causing minor isolated
incidents. In the case of Radio B92 a range of such incidents
took place. They included:
- investigating
who of the employees was using email for communication
with people abroad (1992);
- attempts
to infiltrate people into Opennet who would forward
certain parts of employees emails to the secret police
(1996);
- exercising
pressure on Telecom to occasionally disconnect the encrypted
link between Opennet and XS4ALL, allowing members of
the secret police to intercept the re-establishment
of the encrypted link at the moment of encryption key
exchange for later use for email deciphering (1997);
- attempting
to hijack Internet domains "b92.net" and "opennet.org"
(1999).
A
common feature of these cases was that they were carried
out in a secret manner with a primary aim of spying on the
activities of Radio B92's employees. On the other hand,
the biggest incidents related to explicit censoring of Radio
B92's Internet locations. This occurred twice, at the end
of 1998 and 1999.
THREAT
During
the course of 1998, the Serbian government adopted new Law
on Universities. Following the law's provisions, government
took away from the academic community complete responsibility
of forming steering boards and appointing Deans of all schools
and universities in Serbia. During the process of "managing
things" at the universities, the government quickly
installed Deans who were in direct disagreement with free-minded
professors.
One of the most respected schools in Serbia, the School
of Electrical Engineering at the Belgrade University (ETF),
was severely hit by these measures and more than 58 professors,
docents, assistants and researchers were fired as politically
unsuitable.
At the end of 1998, a group of ETF students initiated a
Web site called "ETF Monkeys". The site carried
critical texts about the dramatic situation in the school,
comic cartoons featuring government-appointed Dean Vlada
Teodosic and his deputy Milos Laban, as well as a discussion
forum. The site contents were hosted at the Angelfire.com
servers, located outside of Yugoslavia.
This student initiative got a wide promotion in the independent
media and quickly became a popular Web destination. Radio
B92 also supported the "ETF Monkeys" and featured
their site in the radio's daily news bulletins and on its
Web site.
Obviously very irritated by a sudden public focus on him
and his controversial activities at the university, ETF
Dean Vlada Teodosic decided to censor the sites of "ETF
monkeys" and Radio B92.
From the contents of an anonymous message sent to Radio
B92 by an employee of the Belgrade University's Computer
Center (which administers the Yugoslav Academic Network),
the chain of events was reconstructed as follows:
At the beginning of December 1998 (most probably on Thursday,
December the 3rd) ETF Dean deputy Milos Laban phoned the
Computer Center of the Belgrade University (RCUB). He said
that he was acting in accord with a decision made by the
Dean of ETF and asked network engineer on duty to block
certain Internet locations. After the engineer explained
that RCUB does not have any power over those locations,
Laban become furious and started threatening. The engineer
than called the manager of RCUB - Dr Zoran Jovanovic - and
informed him about the Laban's request. Mr. Jovanovic called
back Laban and, after brief consultations, issued an order
for putting requested filters on network traffic routers
in RCUB.
It seems, by judging the known facts, that the Dean of ETF
Vlada Teodosic made a unilateral decision to introduce censorship,
without any prior consultations with rector of the Belgrade
University Jagos Puric. The formal decision in a written
form and signed by the Dean of ETF, had been delivered to
RCUB only after the filters had been put in place:
"I'm
informing you hereby that the Internet has been misused
once again for insulting and underrating of certain members
of the ETF Board, by using a Web site on Angelfire.com
server, to which a link was provided on the Radio B92's
Web site. The Dean of ETF was presented on this site in
a Nazi uniform and with a Nazi salute, while Dr Milos
Laban, a member of the ETF Board, was presented as a monkey.
We demand from you to disable use of the Internet for
distribution of such materials in any form, including
the form of email. That is your responsibility according
to Law on Public Information, as well as according to
the common rules of the international network that are
forbidding all forms of misuse."
After
the filters had been put on for certain IP addresses on
network routers, all forms of Internet communication had
been cut for those IP addresses. In this case it was a question
of Angelfire.com servers (which hosted the "ETF Monkeys"
site), b92.net (Radio B92's Internet location) and siicom.com
(one of the mirror sites for Radio B92's news archive).
By this act, Dean Vlada Teodosic denied access to all the
contents of the Angelfire.com servers (not only to the site
of "ETF Monkeys"!), as well as to all contents
situated on Radio B92's and Opennet's servers (daily news
bulletins, Web sites and discussion groups of various NGOs,
independent media, civic initiatives, etc). All students,
professors and associates of all the universities in Serbia
(about 90 institutions), as well as all the other users
of the Yugoslav Academic Network, like institutes and specialized
research centers, were hit by this decision.
The Internet traffic filters on the Academic Network were
functioning without any changes for more than a month. During
the mid-January 1999, without any prior explanation, the
ban was lifted for access to the locations of the Radio
B92. The filters that were cutting access to the site of
"ETF Monkeys" were not removed at that moment
and it is not known when all of them were removed. The lack
of this information was caused by a general lack of public
interest in Internet censorship issues, by the removal of
filters for Radio B92's servers (which further lessened
the media pressure on this affair) and, of course, by the
start of NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, which completely
captured the attention of Yugoslav citizens.
After the end of the war, the management of the ETF once
again introduced Internet traffic filters aimed at Radio
B92 and Opennet servers. This event took place by the beginning
of November 1999, when Vlada Teodosic ordered a similar
blockade, but this time, taught by the previous experience,
only for his school.
Even though this measure hit a much smaller group of Yugoslav
Academic Network users (only those who had access to the
Internet over the ETF's proxy server), the responsibility
of the Dean nor the illegality of this censorship act was
not decreased
MEASURES
TAKEN TO COUNTER THE THREAT
The
following methods proved the most effective in countering
this kind of censorship: content mirroring, changing IP
server numbers frequently and using proxy servers for routing
around the censorship.
As soon as the existence of filters was uncovered, the staff
of Radio B92 and "ETF Monkeys" issued a call for
help from the global Internet community. In the first few
hours of the blockade ten alternative locations (mirrors)
had been established for the two sites. The addresses of
these alternative locations came quickly to the public thanks
to increased media interest in the whole case.
As the introduction of filters completely disabled email
communication, the staff of Opennet immediately started
changing the IP addresses of its servers. Apart from that,
news bulletins of Radio B92 were sent to the users of the
Yugoslav Academic Network via servers, whose IP addresses
were not filtered.
One more effective way of routing around the censorship
was the use of public proxy servers for accessing the Internet.
In this concrete case, the users of the ETF network could
get access to the censored contents if they set-up their
Internet client programs to use addresses of any public
proxy servers, whose IP addresses were not filtered.
RESULTS
ACHIEVED
Combining
the methods outlined above, all censorship attempts based
on putting Internet traffic filters on the key network routers
of the Yugoslav Academic Network, were effectively stopped
and made completely meaningless.
LESSONS
LEARNED
The
affair with filters on the Yugoslav Academic Network emphasized
the need for servers for publishing dissident materials
and supporting dissident groups, outside of reach of a local
repressive regime. If the "ETF Monkeys" and Radio
B92 had been using only servers situated in Yugoslavia (Web
servers, email servers, listservs, etc), any need for introducing
censorship would not exist, as the local regime would manage
to close the servers by quick and effective actions.
The next important element against the censorship attempts
was to find ways to quickly inform the local and global
public about the existence of censorship. Early calls for
help resulted, in this case, in a huge response from individuals
and institutions around the world, who responded to the
call by mirroring the censored contents and thus making
all censorship attempts meaningless.
The last, but not the least important aspect of the whole
affair was the ability of Internet users to speak anonymously.
Many governments have recently started questioning the ability
of their citizens to speak anonymously in cyberspace, defending
this by an alleged need to prevent different kinds of potential
misuses (this trend in Europe is particularly supported
by the current government in France). If the possibility
of tracking Internet users by the government or the ISPs
was in place, giving precise information about the acts
of all persons involved, information would not become so
quickly available to the public. A good deal of precious
time needed for planning and launching counter measures
to the censorship would be irreversibly lost.
December
2000.